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Successor Liability in Washington: When a
Successor Should be Liable for a Predecessor's
Products Liability-Meisel v. M & N Modern
Hydraulic Press Company
In Washington, with four narrow exceptions, a company
that acquires the assets of another company is. not liable for the
latter's debts and liabilities.' Courts developed these rules of"successor' liability" from theories underlying debtor-creditor
relationships. Because the transactions arise out of arms-length
bargaining, the parties' liabilities reflect their legitimate expec-
tations.' Yet, when the claim is raised by a victim of the prede-
cessor's defective product rather than a creditor, the liability of
a successor cannot rest on the expectations of the parties. Mod-
ern products liability4 rests on a public policy that mandates
that society bear the costs associated with technological innova-
tion without regard to the parties' expectations.5 Courts address-
1. Bowyer v. Boss Tweed-Clipper Gold Mines, Inc., 195 Wash. 25, 40, 79 P.2d 713,
720 (1938); Cashar v. Redford, 28 Wash. App. 394, 396, 624 P.2d 194, 195-96 (1981).
Courts have applied the traditional common law rule uniformly throughout all United
States jurisdictions. See 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1973); 19 Am. JuR. 2d Corporations § 1546 (1965).
2. The term "successor" as used in this note is defined as an entity that purchases
or otherwise acquires substantially all of its assets directly from another entity, as
opposed to a "transferee" or "acquiring" corporation, which may acquire assets from a
nonentity, such as an individual or trust. The terms "transferor" and "predecessor" will
be used interchangeably throughout this text as entities that sell or otherwise transfer
their assets either in their own right or in the right of a related party. See Meisel v. M &
N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 97 Wash. 2d 403, 645 P.2d 689 (1982).
3. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L.
Rzy. 86 (1975); Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1305 (1976); Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate
Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 584 (1977). See
generally 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-23
(rev. perm. ed. 1975).
4. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). See also WASH.
Rzy. CODE § 7.72.030 (1981). See infra note 22 for a discussion of the purposes of the
new tort reform act. This article focuses mainly on manufacturers' strict products
liability.
5. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97 (4th
ed. 1971).
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ing the issue of successor liability for the defective product of
the predecessor face a dilemma: whether to follow the tradi-
tional corporate rules or develop new rules to effectuate the pol-
icy of products liability doctrine.'
Addressing this problem, courts have reached varying
results. Some courts apply traditional successor liability law, dis-
regarding the conflict between the considerations underlying
those rules and the rules of products liability.7 Other courts
attempt to fashion new rules within the framework of traditional
successor liability principles.8 A third group of courts have
developed a modern law exception to the traditional rule for
6. At common law, the Washington courts have ruled that strict liability applies to
all products liability claims regardless of whether the theory is construction defect,
design defect, or inadequate warning. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975) (no distinction should be made between construction
defect or design defect and strict product liability should apply); Little v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979) (strict liability analysis should apply in ade-
quacy of warning cases).
As of July 26, 1981, the Washington Legislature limited a manufacturer's strict lia-
bility to construction defects and breach of warranty. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030
(1981). Apparently, the Senate Select Committee on Tort Reform thought prior cases
involving design defects and inadequate warnings, even though framed in strict liability
terms, were more appropriately analyzed in negligence terms. See WASHINGTON STATE
SENATE SELECT COMMIrEE ON TORT & PRODUCT LIAamrry REFORM FINAL REPORT, 47th
Legis., Reg. Sess. 26, reprinted in 1 Senate Journal 37, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981).
Although the legislature attached the label of negligence to design defects and inade-
quate warning, the new statute's effect on the earlier common law holdings is still
unclear.
7. See, e.g., Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978);
Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76
Ill. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979). In Woody, the court declined to depart from the
corporate rules, holding that an acquiring corporation bears no closer relationship to a
defective product produced by a predecessor than does any other company in the indus-
try which is producing the same product. Moreover, the entity that benefited from the
sale of the defective product was the predecessor, since it received the profits. The court
concluded that holding an acquiring corporation liable is unfair and greatly burdens bus-
iness transfers. Cf Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981);
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
8. See Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974)
(expansion of Pennsylvania's traditional de facto merger theory), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (expansion of New
Hampshire's "continuation" theory); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (expansion of the traditional de facto merger theory); Tift v.
Forage King Ind., Inc., 108 Wis.2d 72, 322 N.W. 2d 14 (1982) (expansion of the tradi-
tional "continuation" theory). See infra notes 35-36 for a discussion of the traditional
rationales for "de facto merger" and "continuation" liability theories. See infra text
accompanying notes 46-56 for a discussion of the above cases. See generally Note,
Postdissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Liability, 64 VA. L.
REV. 861 (1978).
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strict tort liability cases.' Exemplifying this third group, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp.," ruled that an
acquiring corporation assumes a predecessor's products liability
when the acquiring corporation receives the business and contin-
ues the predecessor's same product line. Courts following this
modern exception recognize that the traditional corporate rules
ignore the policy supporting modern products liability. While
rejecting the traditional rule's applicability to product liability
claims, the modern exception nonetheless accounts for both the
expectations of the successor corporation and the needs of the
public.
In Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co.,1 the
Washington Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address
the problem of reconciling the traditional successor corporation
rules and products liability doctrine. Rather than take a deter-
minative posture, the court dodged the issue and instead placed
Washington successor liability law in question. Though in dicta
the Meisel court recognized the Ray rule"2 and noted its consis-
tency with the court's prior holdings, the court narrowly read
the successor classification. The court held that a corporation
acquiring a business through a transfer of leased assets and con-
tinuing the transferor's product line will not be liable for the
transferor's products liability. In misinterpreting what consti-
tutes a transfer of assets, the Meisel ruling effectively subverts
the modern rule and provides an easy method for successor cor-
porations to avoid products liability through commonly utilized
corporate designs. Ultimately, the court's holding frustrates the
recognized public policy that seeks to spread the cost of injury
from defective products throughout society rather than force
individual consumers to bear the burden."3
This note examines the problem of products liability in the
context of modern corporate practice. First, this note will
9. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, (1977). See
also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dawejko v. Jor-
gensen Steel Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
10. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). For a brief overview of the
case see text accompanying notes 55-64.
11. 97 Wash. 2d 403, 645 P.2d 689 (1982). The Meisel case arose prior to the enact-
ment of WASH. REv. CODE ch. 7.72 (1981) and thus was governed by the common law
strict products liability doctrine. See generally infra note 23. For a discussion of the
effect of WASH. REv. CODE ch. 7.72 (1981) on successor liability, see infra note 24.
12. See supra text accompanying note 10.
13. See supra note 5.
1983] 325
326 University of Puget Sound Law Review
address products liability doctrine and its underlying rationale.' 4
Next, discussion will focus on the conflict between the policies
underlying the products liability doctrine and the traditional
successor liability rules. Finally, this note will examine the man-
ner in which the modern rule resolves this inherent conflict and
Meisel's effect on that rule, concluding that the Washington
courts should adopt the modern rule without limitations.
In Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., the facts
showed that M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Company (M & N)
had been founded in 1955 by Nicholas Brodsky."' Brodsky was
the sole owner of the corporation and, in his individual capacity,
owned all the manufacturing capital equipment, the land, and
the building necessary to M & N's operation.16 He leased these
assets to M & N. Brodsky died in 1974, and his son, Nicholas
Brodsky, Jr., inherited all the leased assets from his father along
with nearly sole stock ownership of the corporation.' 7 In June
1976, Nicholas formed a new corporation named Modern
Hydraulic Corporation (Modern).' 8 After incorporating Modern,
he evicted M & N from use of the leased assets, divested himself
of his M & N ownership, then leased all the business assets to
Modern.' 9 With Nicholas as president and sole shareholder,
Modern continued to manufacture hydraulic presses. Without
the leased business assets, M & N continued to run as a service
company, repairing presses. Shortly thereafter M & N dis-
solved."0 Prior to both M & N's eviction from the leased assets
and M & N's dissolution, however, M & N had manufactured
and sold a 20 ton press that, in March 1979, malfunctioned and
severed Marie Meisel's hand.2 ' Plaintiff Meisel argued that
Modern Corporation should be held liable as a successor under
14. See supra notes 6 & 11.
15. Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 97 Wash. 2d 403, 404, 645 P.2d
689 (1982).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 404, 645 P.2d at 690. Nicholas Brodsky, Jr. received 99% ownership of M
& N with his mother, Anna Brodsky, recieving the final 1% ownership.
18. Id. at 410, 645 P.2d at 693. Nicholas Jr.'s reason for forming the new corporation
(Modern) was his mother's nagging. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Meisel v. M & N Mod-
em Hydraulic Press Co., 97 Wash. 2d 403, 645 P.2d 689 (1982).
19. Meisel, 97 Wash. 2d at 404, 645 P.2d at 690.
20. Id. at 405, 645 P.2d at 690. Although the M & N Company existed without phys-
ical assets up until the time of the suit, the Washington State Supreme Court assumed





The modern rule that the plaintiff asked the court to apply
was forged from the conflicting policies represented by the rules
of modern products liability and traditional corporate successor
liability. The doctrine of modern products liability expands
beyond traditional tort liability the scope of a manufacturer's
liability to consumers for injuries caused by defective products.2 s
In Washington, a product manufacturer is subject to strict liabil-
ity if the product is not reasonably safe in construction or if the
product does not conform to the manufacturer's express or
implied warranties, and the construction or warranty defects
caused plaintiff's harm. 4 The rationale of modern products lia-
22. Id.
23. The doctrine of strict products liability originated as a hybrid of the two tradi-
tional causes of action: negligence and breach of warranty. The history of products liabil-
ity has been characterized by the constant abolition of various bars to recovery presented
by the traditional causes of action. The bars stemming from breach of warranty include
absence of privity, disclaimer, absence of reliance on warranty, and lack of notice of
breach. The bars stemming from negligence include the burden of proof for establishing
all the elements of a negligence action and the absence of contributory negligence. The
doctrine of strict products liability was adopted largely in response to the inequities that
resulted from the application of the traditional product dissatisfaction causes of action.
See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. Rav. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. Rav. 363 (1965).
Under the traditional product dissatisfaction causes of action, injured plaintiffs had
no remedy against acquiring corporations. In breach of warranty, lack of privity barred
injured victims' claims against acquiring corporations. Under negligence theory, lack of
negligence on the part of the acquiring corporation barred injured plaintiffs from recov-
ery. However, strict liability is founded on a no fault system that promotes compensation
of victims and holds manufacturers responsible for the allocation of product dissatisfac-
tion costs throughout society. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Because proof of
fault is not required in strict products liability actions the traditional bars of privity and
fault are inapplicable. Moreover, under the analysis in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,
560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977), when an acquiring corporation has a sufficiently
close relation with the defective product line, the policies underlying strict products lia-
bility are promoted equitably by holding the acquiring corporation liable. Id. at 31, 560
P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
24. WAsH. R v. CODE § 7.72.060 (1980). The Preamble to the Act states:
The purpose of the amendatory act is to enact further reforms in the tort
law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among parties
at fault.
It is the intent of the legislature that the right of the consumer to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of an unsafe product not be unduly impaired.
It is further the intent of the legislature that retail businesses located primarily
in the State of Washington be protected from the substantially increasing
product liability insurance costs and unwarranted exposure to product liability
328 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 6:323
bility is that manufacturers who place their goods in the stream
of commerce impliedly represent their goods as safe for their
intended use.25 The purpose is to place the responsibility for the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products on the manu-
facturer who put such products on the market, rather than on
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.2 6
Modern products liability doctrine recognizes the relative
abilities of the consumer and manufacturer to bear the risk of
loss from defective products. Because the general consumers in a
technological society lack the ability to weigh the risks of danger
and the costs associated with defective products, they should not
bear the loss for injuries from those products. Moreover, the
consumer is generally ill-equipped to handle the overwhelming
cost of an injury.2 7 Manufacturers, however, are better able to
discern risks associated with products. When forced to compen-
sate those injured, they will also have an incentive to make their
litigation.
Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112. With respect to retailers, the legisla-
ture in enacting WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040 (1981) has limited the causes of action to
negligence or breach of warranty. The statute provides several instances, however, in
which the retailer may face the same liability standard as a manufacturer. WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.72.040(2) (1981). Two exceptions permit a product liability claim against a
retailer when the court determines that the victim would be unable to enforce a judg-
ment against the manufacturer. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.040(2)(b) (1981).
25. See supra note 23. See also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 350-53,
431 A.2d 811, 820-22 (1981). In Ramirez, plaintiff was injured while operating an alleg-
edly defective punch press. The machine involved was manufactured by Johnson
Machine & Press Co. more than 25 years prior to the injury. Before the accident, there
had been three separate transfers of substantially all of the assets, and each intervening
entity had held itself out as the same business enterprise. Id. at 337-40, 431 A.2d at 812-
15. The court realized that the traditional corporate rules were inconsistent with the
rapidly developing principles of strict liability in tort and unresponsive to the legitimate
interests of products liability plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court recognized that the tradi-
tional corporate rules, which were developed to protect creditors and minority sharehold-
ers, place unwarranted emphasis on the form of the transfer rather than the practical
effect of the transaction. Id. at --- , 431 A.2d at 815-17. The court ultimately held
Amsted liable under Ray's modern rule, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, rea-
soning that the imposition of liability on Amsted is consistent with the public policy of
spreading the risk to society at large for the cost of injuries from defective products. Id.
at -, 431 A.2d at 820-22. The court further justified the imposition as a burden neces-
sarily attached to its enjoymant of Johnson's trade name, good will, and continuation of
the manufacturing enterprise. Id. at -- , 431 A.2d at 822-23. But see generally Com-
ment, A Search for the Outer Limits to Successor Corporation Liability for Defective
Products of Predecessors, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 117 (1982).
26. See Note, Postdissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor
Liability, supra note 8, at 862.
27. See supra note 5.
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products safe.28 Moreover, with his superior knowledge of the
product and its risks, the manufacturer is in a more cost-effec-
tive position to spread the risk of harm. On one hand, the manu-
facturer can acquire insurance at a fair price. On the other hand,
with or without liability insurance the manufacturer can pass
the cost of products liability claims on to customers, thus plac-
ing the risk of loss finally on society as a whole, the ultimate
beneficiary of technological innovation. The modern products
liability doctrine, therefore, shifts the cost of defective products
to society in order to assure that the individual is compensated
for this innocent loss.
In contrast to the products liability rules, the traditional
rule of successor liability does not seek to assure recovery for
products liability plaintiffs. The traditional rule seeks, rather, to
effectuate the legitimate expectations of the parties to particular
transactions.
At common law, the general rule is that a business entity's
may purchase, or otherwise acquire, the assets of another busi-
ness entity without acquiring its debts or obligations.3" In the
context of corporate structures, liability adheres to the fictional
corporate entity regardless of the severing of the business assets.
By forcing the corporate entity to retain its liabilities, the tradi-
tional rule assures that creditors and minority shareholders can
look to the entity with whom they dealt for satisfaction of their
obligations. Moreover, by freeing the acquiring corporation from
liability for the transferring corporation's obligations, the rule
facilitates the transfer of capital. Freed from the possibility of
judgment awards and other types of unascertainable debts, 1 the
purchaser can accurately assess the value of the purchase.
The courts have recognized, however, that the traditional
rule may allow a transferring corporation, under certain circum-
28. Id.
29. The term "entity" refers to the formalized corporate existence brought about
through proper statutory procedures and also to sole proprietorships and partnerships.
The term "enterprise" refers to the nature of the business conducted by any particular
entity. For purposes of simplicity, corporate entities will be discussed throughout this
comment, but for discussion of sole proprietorship and partnership successor liability see
Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979); Tift v.
Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
30. Bowyer v. Boss Tweed-Clipper Gold Mines, 195 Wash. 25, 40, 79 P.2d 713, 720
(1938); Cashar v. Redford, 28 Wash. App. 394, 396, 624 P.2d 194, 195-96 (1981).
31. Unascertainable debts include potential liability for obligations such as products
dissatisfaction claims. See Note, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset
Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, supra note 3, at 593-94 (1977).
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stances, effectively to avoid its obligations to the detriment of
creditors and minority shareholders.3 The courts have identified
four circumstances where this may occur: first, where the acquir-
ing entity expressly or impliedly assumes the transferor's liabili-
ties," second, where the transfer amounts to a consolidation" or
de facto merger, 5 third, where the acquiring corporation is
32. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
33. The rationale for holding the acquiring corporation liable when it assumes the
liabilities of its predecessor is that the two entities have bargained at arm's length and
have thus devalued the assets according to the liabilities assumed. Therefore, if consider-
ation is not sufficient, creditors should have a right to claim their obligations from the
entity undertaking their debtor's responsibilities. Note, though, that an acquiring corpo-
ration rarely expressly assumes the products liability of another entity. Moreover, courts
have been reluctant to find an implied assumption of liability between the bargaining
entities. See Adams'v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (suc-
cessor's disclaimer of any nondisclosed debts was determinative as not expressly or
impliedly assuming products liability arising from predecessor's defective products). But
see Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970) (purchase agreement that
included assumption of broad categories of liabilities was sufficient to hold acquiring
corporation liable for transferor's products liability).
34. In a consolidation two entities form one new entity; in a merger the two combine
leaving one of the two entities as the survivor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 891 (rev. 5th ed.
1979). For purposes of this article, however, both consolidation and merger will be dis-
cussed as mergers.
35. Where one corporation merges with another according to statutory require-
ments, the survivor corporation is responsible for the liabilities of the nonexistent corpo-
ration. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.20.060 (1981). The rationale for statutory merger is that
since one entity is absorbing another and since an entity consists of assets and liabilities
the surviving corporation receiving the benefit of the dissolving corporation's assets must
also receive the burden of its liabilities. The statutory requirements with which merging
companies must comply were designed to protect the rights of creditors and minority
shareholders of the dissolving entity. The creditors are protected by a transfer of liabili-
ties to the survivor. The dissenting minority shareholders are protected by appraisal
rights that entitle them to the fair market value for their shares. WASH. REV. CODE §
23A.24.040 (1981). When a corporation sold its assets for the acquiring corporation's
stock, creditors and minority shareholders traditionally were not afforded any of the pro-
tections offered by statutory merger. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. The
courts developed the de facto merger doctrine which provides that a transaction closely
resembling a statutory merger, such as a sale of assets for the acquiring corporation's
stock, should be subject to the same legal consequences as a surviving corporation under
statutory merger. The rationale for de facto merger is that acquiring entities should not
be allowed to circumvent the predecessor's liabilities because of the form of the transac-
tion if the transaction has the indicia of a statutory merger. The traditional elements of
de facto merger include: (1) consideration for the purchased assets paid in the form of
the acquiring corporation's stock, which ensures that the transferor's shareholders will
retain ownership in the acquiring corporation, (2) some identity of management, and (3)
prompt extinction of predecessor. These are the basic elements present in a statutory
merger where the surviving corporation as a matter of law is liable for seller corporation
obligations. See Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J. 1976); Klo-
berdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
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merely a "continuation" of the transferor," fourth, where the
transferor entered into the transfer agreement fraudulently in
order to escape liability.3 7 In any one of these four circum-
stances, courts will find that the acquiring entity is a "successor"
to the liabilities and obligations of the selling corporation. The
theory supporting this "successor liability" rests on the consid-
eration the purchaser provides to the seller.39 Where none of the
circumstances identified by the four exceptions exist, it is likely
that the seller has received consideration from the purchaser
adequate to cover the seller's liabilities. In turn, creditors and
shareholders can recover their obligations upon the seller's dis-
288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super.
476, 356 A.2d 458 (Law Div. 1976).
36. The "continuation" theory is the most nebulous concept. It, like the de facto
merger theory, reflects the concepts of "separate entities" and adequate consideration.
Liability will be transferred from the transferor to the transferee when the latter is, in
effect, a reincarnation of the former. The common law elements include: (1) common
identity of officers, directors and shareholders, and (2) insufficiency of consideration in
light of assets transferred. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D.
Colo. 1968); Seipp v. Stetson Ross Mach. Co., 32 Wash. App. 224, 646 P.2d 783 (1982).
The rationale for the continuation theory is continuation of the corporate entity, not
continuation of the business enterprise. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Borden Co.,
363 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1973). Thus, again, ascertainable creditors at the time of
dissolution are protected by a right against the predecessor if adequate consideration has
been received, or a right against the transferee where continuation is found. Yet, unlike
ascertainable creditors, products liability plaintiffs who rely on outward continuation of
a business enterprise, are not protected where "continuation" of the corporate entity
cannot be shown.
37. The common law tests for this exception include: (1) a showing of fraud or
actions otherwise lacking good faith, (2) insufficient consideration for the assets, and (3)
predecessor left unable to respond to creditor's claims. The rationale for this exception is
that a corporation may not absolve itself of its liabilities through fraudulent transfer
under the protection of the separate existence of entities. See, e.g., Wolff v. Shreveport
Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789 (1916); McKee v. Harris-Sey-
bold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), overruled, Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140
N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Law Div. 1976).
38. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968). Virtually
identical expressions of the successor liability rule are found in cases decided as early as
the turn of the century. See, e.g., Chase v. Michigan Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 80 N.W. 717
(1899); Swing v. Empire Lumber Co., 105 Minn. 356, 117 N.W. 467 (1908). See also
Spring Creek Oil Corp. v. Dillman, 90 Okla. 129, 215 P. 1053 (1923); Burkholder v.
Okmulgee Coal Co., 82 Okla. 80, 196 P. 679 (1921).
39. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, supra
note 3, at 93; Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Trans-
ferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, supra note 3, at 595-96; Note, Products Liabil-
ity for Successor Corporations: A Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 360-63
(1978); Note, Postdissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Lia-
bility, supra note 8, at 864-65. See also, Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361, 366 n.16 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
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solution. If one of the four circumstances is present, however,
the consideration is most likely insufficient to meet the seller's
obligations. The exceptions assure that creditors and sharehold-
ers can pursue the acquiring corporation as a successor for
recovery of outstanding liabilities from which the acquiring cor-
poration did not purchase its freedom.40
Although the common law exceptions protect commercial
creditors, they frequently leave the products liability plaintiff
without a remedy. Since an acquiring corporation will generally
purchase the transferor's assets for consideration adequate to
avoid those known liabilities that the traditional rule seeks to
protect (i.e., traditional debts and obligations), the traditional
rule looks to the transferor as the source of recovery. If, how-
ever, the transferor has dissolved, and if more than two years
have elapsed from the time of dissolution, 1 the injured plaintiff
is left without a remedy. Thus, while the traditional rules of cor-
porate law satisfy the needs of traditional creditors whose claims
arise before or soon after the predecessor's dissolution, those
rules provide no adequate remedy for the typical products liabil-
ity plaintiff whose claims frequently arise years after the prod-
uct's purchase.
The failure of the traditional rules of successor liability to
meet the needs of the products liability plaintiff results from the
rule's limited purpose.4 2 The rule's purpose is to protect persons
having obligations against a business entity. Although a prod-
ucts liability plaintiff falls into that class of person, the tradi-
tional rule was fashioned to meet the needs of only those claim-
ants whose claims were clearly identifiable at the time of the
transfer.43 Fashioned long before the advent of the modern prod-
ucts liability doctrine, the traditional rule did not anticipate the
social policies underlying the new doctrine. 4 Consequently, the
application of the traditional rule frustrates the policies of mod-
40. See supra note 39.
41. Washington's postponement abatement statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.28.250
(Supp. 1982), allows suits against the dissolvee corporation within two years from the
date of dissolution. The claim sued upon, however, must have arisen before the corpora-
tion dissolved. Id. At common law, a corporation's ability to be sued terminated when
the corporation was legally dissolved. See 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8127, 8142-8143 (rev. perm. ed. 1962).
42. See supra notes 3 & 38 and accompanying text.
43. See Note, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transfer-
ees-An Assault on Another Citadel, supra note 3, at 590-93. See also supra note 3.




Realizing the inequities that resulted from applying the cor-
porate successor liability rule to products liability claimants,
several courts attempted to expand the scope of the de facto
merger and continuation exceptions, under which products lia-
bility claimants generally attempt to recover.45 In Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co.,"' and Knapp v. North American
Rockwell Corp.,4" the courts expanded the de facto merger
exception by eliminating some of the traditional elements and
replacing them with new elements based on the public policy
underlying strict products liability. The traditional elements of
the de facto merger include: (1) consideration for the purchased
assets in the form of the acquiring corporation's stock, (2) some
identity of management, and (3) prompt extinction of the prede-
cessor. 8 The Turner court elimiminated the stock consideration
element and instead looked to the continuation of the enter-
prise.49 In Knapp, the court excluded the prompt extinction of
predecessor element in favor of weighing the relative ability of
the successor to bear the loss. 5 0 Two other decisions, Tift v. For-
age King Industries, Inc.51 and Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,52
expanded the traditional continuation theory by virtually elimi-
nating all of the traditional elements and replacing them with
new elements fashioned from strict products liability policy. The
traditional elements of continuation include: (1) common iden-
tity of officers, directors and shareholders, and (2) inadequate
consideration for the assets transferred. 5 These two courts elim-
inated both traditional elements and replaced them with the
continuation of business enterprise as seen by the general pub-
lic." The Tift and Cyr courts relaxed the narrow exceptions
which adequately protected creditors and minority shareholders
to include products liability claimants when justice required.
45. See supra note 8.
46. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
47. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
48. See supra note 35.
49. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 423-26, 244 N.W.2d 873, 880-
82 (1976).
50. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369-70 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
51. 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
52. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
53. See supra note 36.
54. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1974); Tift v. Forage
King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72. 76-82, 322 N.W.2d 14, 16-18 (1982).
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The efforts of these four courts have stretched the tradi-
tional corporate rule beyond its purpose in a piecemeal and
often inconsistent manner."' Their rationales do nothing to rec-
oncile the inherently distinct circumstances in which the tradi-
tional rules arise. In fact, under the Tift holding, creditors and
shareholders are now granted even more protection as a result of
the relaxed standards."6
Rather than broadly read a rule designed for limited pur-
poses, the California Supreme Court correctly recognized the
inherent incompatability of traditional successor liability rules
and the modern products liability policy, and adopted a modern
rule that addresses the problem. In Ray v. Alad Corp.,57 the
court developed an exception for successor liability specifically
designed to deal with products liability claims. It did so by
examining both products liability policies and the traditional
corporate principles, concluding that the traditional rules could
not adequately protect products liability plaintiffs."
In Ray, the plaintiff was injured by a defective ladder and
brought suit for damages." Prior to the claim, however, the
manufacturer had sold its assets for cash and then dissolved.60 A
new and separately owned corporation acquired the plant,
equipment, inventory, trade name, personnel, customer lists, and
goodwill of the manufacturer, and continued the same line of
business under the same corporate name.61 There was no inter-
vening manufacturing hiatus during or after the sales transac-
55. Tift, 108 Wis. 2d at 104, 322 N.W.2d at 29 (Callow, J., dissenting). Judge Callow
stated in his dissent, "[b]ecause the majority has not cited any authority in support of its
[continuation and de facto merger theory] conclusion, I can only believe that it seeks not
to apply the law as it is; it seeks to mold the law in the image it wishes it to be." Id. at
87, 322 N.W.2d at 20. See also Note, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate
Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, supra note 3, at 607; Note, Postdis-
solution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Liability, supra note 26,
at 864.
56. See Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982)
(court refashioned and broadened the traditional elements without justification or dis-
tinction between tort and contract creditors).
57. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). See generally Note, Prod-
ucts Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break From Tradition, supra note 39. Cf.
Note, Ray v. Alad Corporation: Imposing Liability as the Successor Corporation for the
Defective Products of the Predecessor Corporation, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 338 (1979).
58. See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
59. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
60. Id. at 25-26, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
61. Id. at 24-28, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
[Vol. 6:323
Successor Liability
tions.62 The court recognized that if it applied the traditional
successor liability rule, the victim would be without a remedy
because the predecessor had received adequate consideration for
its assets, distributed the consideration to its shareholders, and
dissolved before the plaintiff's claim arose.8 Strict products lia-
bility policy, however, mandated a remedy. Recognizing the
undesirability of modifying the traditional corporate rules, the
Ray court formulated a new test based on the policies underly-
ing manufacturer's strict products liability: the compensation of
injured victims and the allocation of product dissatisfaction
costs throughout society.2
The court ruled that a corporation which acquires a manu-
facturing business and continues its product line assumes strict
products liability for defects in products produced and distrib-
uted by the entity from which the business was acquired. 5 The
court based its holding on three underlying rationales. First, the
transferee's acquisition of the business enterprise effectively
destroyed plaintiff's remedies in obtaining compensation from
the predecessor corporation. Second, the transferee could easily
assume the cost spreading role by passing costs onto its consum-
ers. Third, where the transferee has benefited from the contin-
ued operation of the predecessor's business, it is fair to impose
liability.6
The traditional corporate exceptions upon which products
liability plaintiffs have relied differ from the Ray rule in many
respects. The Ray rule focuses on the continuation of the enter-
prise, not the entity. Instead of focusing on the internal for-
malities of the transfer of assets, as traditional corporate rules
do, the modern rule looks to the external realities of the
transfer.
The courts' first duty under the modern rule is to determine
whether the transferee has acquired substantially all the trans-
feror's assets,68 leaving the transferor no more than a corporate
62. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
63. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
64. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
65. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
66. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
67. See supra note 29.
68. The term "substantially all of the assets" means the assets the transferring
entity uses to carry on the business enterprise. See generally Gimbel v. Signal Co.'s, 316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd per curiam on limited grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
These assets generally include physical assets, such as machinery and buildings, and
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shell. Second, the court must determine whether the transferee
is holding itself out to the general public as the same corpora-
tion as the transferor by producing the same product line under
a similar name. Finally, the court must determine whether the
transferee is benefiting from the goodwill of the transferor. If
these three criteria are met, the transferee is deemed to be in
the best position to exact costs for insurance from its predeces-
sor and its customers in order to protect innocent consumers.
These three criteria also provide guidelines by which acquiring
corporations may set up their transfer agreements. 9 The Ray
court has therefore, developed a modern successor liability
exception for strict products liability claims that both ade-
quately protects the needs of an injured consumer and provides
acquiring corporations guidelines with which to structure their
transactions.
In Meisel, the plaintiff argued that the Washington court
should adopt the more appropriate Ray rule. Meisel's claim was
based on the fact that M & N, the original manufacturer, was
left as no more than a corporate shell after the transfer of assets.
Second, Modern had the ability to assume the original manufac-
turer's risk spreading role. Finally, considering the continuity of
product line and corporate name, it would be fair to hold Mod-
ern liable.70 In dicta, the Meisel court accepted plaintiff's theory,
recognizing that the modern rule was beneficial and not incon-
sistent with Washington's products liability policy. 71 The court,
intangible assets, such as trade name, trademark, and goodwill. Moreover, when substan-
tially all of these have been transferred, the transferor is generally left as a corporate
shell, existing mainly to wind up corporate affairs prior to dissolution. Dawejko v. Jor-
gensen Steel Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
69. A few courts have attempted to limit the scope of the modern rule. See, e.g.,
Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (modern rule should not apply
where assets transferred through bankruptcy or intervening successors); Jacobs v. Lake-
wood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (modern rule should not
apply when there is manufacturing hiatus prior to the transfer of assets); Bernard v. Kee
Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (modern rule should not apply to small corpora-
tions). But see Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (modern
rule may apply to remote successors); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15,
434 A.2d 106 (1981) (modern rule not to be read too narrowly).
70. Meisel, 97 Wash. 2d at 407, 645 P.2d at 691. After formation, Modern continued
to use the Los Angeles Machinery Broker as its distributor. In fact, the Los Angeles
distributor thought Modern had only undergone a name change and was the same entity
as M & N. Id. at 407, 645 P.2d at 690.
71. Id. at 408 n.1, 645 P.2d at 692 n.1. The Ray court fashioned its modern rule in
the context of strict products liability. Since many states embrace strict products liabil-
ity doctrine they can easily adopt the modern Ray rule. In Washington, the new products
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nevertheless, held that Modern was not a successor by narrowly
defining what constitutes a transfer of assets. In order for a
transfer to give rise to a successor corporation, the court noted,
there must be a direct transfer of assets from one entity in its
own right to another entity in its own right. Therefore, a trans-
fer by a related party, such as an officer or majority shareholder
of a corporate entity, in his personal capacity, to another entity,
will not satisfy Meisel's entity-to-entity requirement. Here,
because the president was sole owner of the business assets at all
times, the court found there was no actual transfer of assets by
M & N to Modern, and therefore, no successor. 2 Thus, the court
liability statute retains strict liability for construction and warranty defects against man-
ufacturers, see supra note 6, while purporting to apply a new negligence standard to
manufacturer design and warning defect claims. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030 (1981);
WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON TORT AND PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM,
FINAL REPORT, 47th Legis. Reg. Sess. 26, reprinted in 1 Senate Journal 617, 624-25, 631,
Reg. & 1st Ex. Seas. (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. Thus the question inevitably
arises whether Washington courts could apply Ray in a negligence context. Courts have
confused negligence and strict liability standards for years. See REPORT, supra at 17, 1
Senate Journal at 625, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for
Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REV. 593, 600-01 (1980); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There
Really a Difference in Law or Economics, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259, 259-65 (1978).
In either case, courts have articulated balancing tests in lieu of more traditional discus-
sions of fault. The Washington law builds on the common law and dubs the new stan-
dard a "negligence" standard. REPORT, supra at 17-18, 1 Senate Journal at 624-25, Reg.
& 1st Ex. Sess. (1981). The common law essentially afforded a strict liability standard.
See supra note 6. The new Washington law either adopts that standard or articulates a
balancing test drawing on the common law. Regardless, the policies enunciated for the
Ray rule in a strict liability context apply equally to products liability under the new
Washington products liability statute.
In addition to modern products liability policies, the Washington statute creates
new support for the imposition of successor liability. Under WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.040
(2)(b), the original manufacturer's liability is imputed to the retailer where the court
determines that the original manufacturer is judgment proof. However, the preamble to
the new tort and products liability reform act states that the legislature's intent was to
protect retailers from the overwhelming costs of products liability insurance and the bur-
den of products liability litigation. See supra note 24. On the other hand Ray's modern
rule, as stated in this casenote, places the responsibility for the original manufacturer's
products liability on the successor corporation that carries on the business enterprise.
Arguably the successor that carries on the manufacturer's business enterprise is in a
much better position to have notice of design defects and to give adequate warning than
is a remote retailer. Moreover, a successor is in a better position to exact the cost for
insurance from its predecessor. Furthermore, the successor corporation is in a better
position to correct the design defect and pass the costs onto the consumer. Therefore,
the policies are incorporated in the modern rule and the intent of the legislature as
stated in the preamble to the tort and products liability reform act would better protect
retailers by imputing the original manufacturer's negligent products liability for design
defects and inadequacy of warning on the successor corporation.
72. Meisel, 97 Wash. 2d at 407-08, 645 P.2d at 691-92. See also 15 W. FLETCHER,
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held that a corporation that leases its business assets, which
were formerly leased by a different corporation, cannot be classi-
fied as a successor corporation regardless of the reality of the
transaction. Consequently, the acquiring corporation will not be
held liable for the transferor's products liability obligations.
In narrowly defining what constitutes a transfer of assets,
the Washington Supreme Court failed to recognize the practical-
ities of corporate existence and misinterpreted the scope of the
modern rule. The court drew a distinction between leased and
owned assets based solely on the facts of the cases plaintiff had
cited as authority, without examining whether there was a prac-
tical difference between leased and owned assets worthy of a dis-
tinction. Further, the court failed to examine whether a distinc-
tion between leased and owned assets was justified by the
policies underlying the modern products liability doctrine and
the modern rule. In a practical sense, the difference between a
corporation leasing its assets and owning them outright is an
artificial distinction.73 A corporate director's decision to lease or
purchase physical assets typically rests on financial capacity and
tax considerations.7 4 The court's removal of liability from the
transfer of leased assets as opposed to wholly-owned assets will
only serve to make a distinction on the basis of how a transfer-
ring entity holds its assets. Consequently, a decision that once
rested on financial considerations will now be based on the
desire to avoid products liability.7
supra note 3, at §§ 7122-23.
73. Although a detailed tax analysis of the consequences of holding business assets
was beyond the scope of Meisel, and is beyond the scope of this article, it is well
accepted that the leasing of assets has significant tax advantages. See generally 39 INST.
ON FED. TAX. (MATTHEWs BENDER) § 35.06 (1981); Sales and Leasebacks, TAX MGhr
(BNA) No. 36-3d (Dec. 28, 1981).
74. See supra note 73.
75. Id. See also Warehouse Indem. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 128 Ariz. 504, 627
P.2d 235 (1981). This was a labor relations case governed by a successor statute which
stated that "an organization . . ., which in any manner acquires the trade ... or busi-
ness, or substantially all of the assets thereof, shall be liable, . . . for any contributions,
interest and penalties due . . . and unpaid by such predecessor employer. ... Id. at
506, 627 P.2d at 237. This case had a fact situation similar to that in Meisel. In Ware-
house Indem., the acquiring corporation acquired substantially all of the leased assets of
the predecessor and carried on the same line of business. Moreover, it held itself out to
the public as the same business. The court held the acquiring corporation liable under
the statute because the statute did not focus on the internal form of the transaction;
rather, it focused on the external substance of the transaction. Thus, it was unimportant
that there was no direct transfer of assets between entities. What was important was the
transfer and continuation of the business enterprise. Id. at 506, 627 P.2d at 237. Further-
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Even assuming that a distinction between the holding of
leased and wholly-owned assets could be made, the Meisel court
misinterpreted the scope of the modern rule. The court, in
deciding the case, examined the internal structure of the trans-
fer-how the assets were held, which party transferred the
assets, and which party received the assets-concluding that the
transfer of assets must be from one entity to another entity in
order for products liability to also transfer. The modern rule,
however, focuses on the content of the transfer and the party's
post-transfer conduct, which bear no relation to the manner in
which the entity's assets are held. The inquiry centers on the
type of assets used in manufacturing, the product line produced,
and the business name and trademark used. Thus, even though
the acquiring corporation is a different entity by law, it was held
liable when it purchased or otherwise acquired the business
assets of another and held itself out to the general public as the
same business enterprise. Thus, under the modern rule, the bus-
iness enterprise is determined by the nature of the business con-
ducted, not by either the legal niceties that have defined the cor-
porate entity, or the manner by which it holds assets.
The practical effects of the Meisel court's misinterpretation
are many. First, the court relieved a manufacturer properly held
liable under the same modern rule that the court ostensibly rec-
ognized as proper. In Meisel, Modern took possession of sub-
stantially all the physical assets formally leased by M & N,
including the plant and capital equipment.76 Modern also
received the benefits of the trade name and goodwill of M & N. 77
Furthermore, Modern continued the same product line without
interruption.78 These factors show continuation of the corporate
enterprise from M & N to Modern. Under the modern rule, lia-
bility would follow.
On a broader level, the Meisel ruling will emasculate the
modern rule, once it is formally recognized by the court. The
Washington State Supreme Court's distinction based on the
internal form of the holding of the business assets and its misin-
terpretation of the modern rule may result in even fewer injured
products liability plaintiffs receiving a recovery. The effect of
more, note that the California Supreme Court formulated the modern rule from a labor
relations context. See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
76. Meisel, 97 Wash. 2d 403, 406-07, 645 P.2d 689, 690-91 (1982).
77. Id. at 407, 645 P.2d at 691.
78. Id.
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Meisel is to allow corporate owners to dissolve for any tenuous
business purpose and reform under a new corporate entity, pro-
ducing the same product, thereby circumventing successor liabil-
ity altogether.79 Following Meisel, any corporation can effec-
tively rid itself of its projected future products liability claims
by a simple three-step transaction. First, the original entity
arranges a typical sale and leaseback transaction with a related
party, such as a majority shareholder or principal officer.80 Sec-
ond, the original entity's directors and shareholders, for some
business purpose, form a new corporate entity, with a similar
name and then dissolve the original entity. Third, the related
party that now owns the business assets leases them back to the
new entity, which can now continue the same product line as the
original entity without responsibility for the original entity's
products liability. If corporations go through this process of ref-
ormation every few years, they could virtually prevent the great
majority of, if not all, injured plaintiffs from recovering on any
products dissatisfaction claims. The sole factor underlying this
ability is the Meisel court's artificial distinction between leased
and owned assets.
By focusing on the single artificial lease/own characteriza-
tion, the Meisel rule provides directors and controlling stock-
holders with a new incentive to operate with leased assets alone.
The corporate world may now base its lease/purchase decisions
on the basis of projected liability, as well as the financial and tax
considerations that properly ground such decisions. Rather than
assure recovery by legitimate products liability plaintiffs, Meisel
legitimizes a process designed specifically to frustrate that recov-
ery. Because of the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation,
the modern rule may protect even fewer injured plaintiffs by
providing corporations with a simple three-step transaction to
circumvent products liability altogether.
Because the Meisel court declined to rule on the adoption of
the modern rule, Washington courts are still faced with the
dilemma of how to best treat products liability plaintiffs who
79. See Wall Street J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 27, col. 3-6. The Wall Street Journal report
states how one manufacturer, Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., leased its business assets to a
new entity under private ownership, and now exists solely to handle its asbestos products
liability claims. The purpose of the move was to shield the business enterprise from the
asbestos claims.
80. See generally Sales and Leasebacks, TAx. MGMT. (BNA) No. 36-3d, at 1-9,
(Dec. 28, 1981). See also supra note 73.
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generally are left without recovery under the traditional succes-
sor liability rules. The corporate rules were designed to protect
creditors and minority shareholders. The modern rule has
presented Washington with a beneficial rule, consistent with
Washington products liability policy and one which balances the
needs of the corporate world against the needs of the general
public.
The Washington Supreme Court improperly held that Mod-
ern Corporation was not a successor for the purposes of products
liability. The Court failed to recognize the practical realities of
corporate existence and the scope of the modern rule. Rather
than look at the form of the corporate transfer, as the Meisel
court did, the court should focus on the continuity of the enter-
prise: acquisition of all, or substantially all, of the predecessor's
assets, continuity of the product line, and dissolution of the
predecessor." Under that rule, liability will properly follow a
continuing enterprise, thus protecting the general public's health
and safety by assuring recovery for injury from defective prod-
ucts, and providing incentive to manufacturers to produce safe
products. In this day and age, where corporate acquisitions are
becoming an everyday occurrence, the courts must not lose sight
of the injured consumer, who, under the traditional corporate
rules, is left without compensation.
Robert C. Manlowe
81. For a discussion of various pertinent factors involved in the determination of a
continuing enterprise see Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 25-26, 434
A.2d 106, 111 (1981).
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